The Regime is Dead, Long Live the Regime!
by MUSA al-GHARBI
To be clear, the Egyptian military does not aspire towards total control of
the state, with all of the responsibilities entailed thereby—what they
want, what they have always wanted, is to be beyond accountability to
the civilian population, to have their budget immune to external
oversight or reduction, to reserve the right to intercede as they deem
necessary in the political affairs of the state without any reciprocal
checks by legislators, and to respond with impunity against those whom
they deem to be a threat to their social order.
It was in the service of these ends that they deposed Husni Mubarak: a
maneuver designed to preserve, not change, the status quo. In the
aftermath of their first coup they unyieldingly struggled to limit the
civilian government from exerting any meaningful control over critical
state institutions—efforts which were bolstered by other elements of the
“deep state” with complimentary vested interests in perpetuating the
existing order—culminating in a second coup against Egypt’s first
democratically-elected president less than a year into his term.
It’s been a tumultuous affair, but it appears as though the junta’s efforts
have paid off.
Among the primary grievances of the protestors in Egypt and across the
MENA region was the corruption and overreach of the military, police,
and intelligence services. Nonetheless, Egypt’s new draft constitution
renders all of these institutions completely unaccountable to the civilian
populace or their elected representatives.
Not only does the constitution enshrine the al-Selmi communiqué with
regards to the military, it also expands many of its key provisions to the
police, judiciary, and religious authorities. It allows all of these actors to
substantially intervene in the civilian government while preventing said
government from interfering in these institutions. In this vein, it
establishes the indefinite power of the military to arrest and try civilians
while rendering not only the military, but also the police, immune to
civilian prosecution.
Of course, one of the key aspirations of the coalition who rallied to
overthrow Mursi was to establish Egypt as a secular state—these
protestors will find their aspirations dashed as well (perhaps rightly so):
Sure, the draft does include provisions which prohibit the participation of
political parties “formed on the basis of religion”—an article which will
certainly be used as the legal pretext to abolish the Freedom and Justice
Party and any other political force with perceived organizational or
ideological ties to the Muslim Brotherhood; even in the absence of this
legal framework, the Brothers have been persecuted relentlessly since
the coup which removed Muhammad Mursi (contrary to the rhetoric,
the Brotherhood remains popular: after all, if few Egyptians supported
them there would be little need to exclude the Brothers from elections–
they would fail on their own. They are being banned, not because the
people hate them, but on the contrary, because so many continue to
support them).
However, considering the vast sums of aid (already in excess of $16
billion) being poured into the country by Saudi Arabia in order to staveoff
Egypt’s imminent collapse (and therefore, an authentic revolution),
we can expect that the salafi al-Nour party will be mysteriously exempt
from this new provision. Clearly, this is their understanding as well, as
they have unequivocally endorsed the draft constitution, just as they
endorsed the coup—shrewdly angling for greater influence for
themselves and their Saudi benefactors. The army, for its part, is trying
to lure the Islamists to their side in a bid to alienate the Brotherhood.
That is, the laws are not about establishing Egypt as a secular state—
instead, they are designed to exclude particular influential political forces
from the public sphere; consider:
The new military constitution also declares the sharia as the foundation
of all of Egypt’s law. While the language assigning the responsibility of
interpreting these laws to al-Azhar has been removed, considering that
al-Azhar is THE center for Islamic jurisprudence in Egypt (and for much
of the Sunni world), this redaction is little more than cosmetic. In fact,
the religious authorities have played a central role in legitimizing the
coup and subsequent crackdown–as a reward, the new draft actually
places al-Azhar’s leadership beyond the sphere of civilian accountability
as well and permits only those imams with credentials from al-Azhar to
preach, granting them a virtual monopoly over Egypt’s primary religion.
They could never have dreamed of such influence under Mursi.
Simultaneously, the constitution restricts the right to worship
exclusively to the three Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity and
Islam. Even some from among these religions may be excluded on the
basis that they are not “proper” Muslims, Christians, etc.–in fact, these
efforts are already well-underway.
Of course, many Egyptians opposed the coup and have been unyielding
in their opposition. Others who supported the coup under the naïve
assumption that the military would step back and meaningfully empower
a liberal, secular, civilian government have come to see (perhaps, too
late) that the SCAF has never shared their values and aspirations. Most
of the Egyptian public was against the coup at the time it was carried out,
and despite a temporary surge in popular support for the military in the
aftermath, most seem to be returning to their initial conviction that it
was a mistake to depose Mursi.
Nonetheless, given the public’s general fatigue with social unrest, the
near-total lack of external oversight over the Egyptian government, and
the ruthless crackdown on dissent within Egypt—one way or another, it
was assured that the referendum would pass with impressive numbers.
And by this time next year a new civilian government will likely be
elected.
The fact that these officials will have little control over critical state
institutions even as said institutions wield undue influence over the
government, that the social and economic injustices which motivated the
uprising will not only persist but will be written into the state’s founding
document, that the rights and freedoms the protestors sought will not
have been meaningfully achieved, that the oft-maligned influence of the
United States is being traded for a more ominous and far-reaching role
for the anti-democratic ”Club of Kings“—the new constitution
conveniently papers-over these concerns.
The Results Are In…
The interim government has just announced that the results of the
referendum: 38.6% of eligible voters went to the polls, with 98% voting
in favor of the measure. We can set aside concerns that these sort of
victory margins (2% dissent opposed) evoke the “elections” which
dictators frequently hold to put up a façade of legitimacy, especially
given the total lack of external oversight over any part of the process
and the well-documented suppression of any campaigns opposing the
measure–there is another disturbing paradox which presents this from
being a “ringing endorsement” of the coup, namely the low voter
turnout.
When the ”Islamist” constitution was approved in a referendum in which
a similar portion of the electorate (32.9%) turned out to vote, the
opposition decried the poll as illegitimate: the overwhelming support by
those who turned out to vote may not reflect the will of the silent (2/3)
majority who did not. Somehow these concerns have mysteriously
vanished now that the shoe is on the other foot.
Of course, as I have argued elsewhere, it is impossible to infer much
from uncast ballots precisely because they were not cast. That said,
there seems to be greater empirical support to suggest that a plurality of
public opinion is likely against the draft, if one was into those sorts of
divinations.
Insofar as we take the numbers at their face value, the one thing the
results suggest (both the overwhelming support for the measure among
those who turned out, and the low overall turnout) is that the Egyptian
public remains deeply polarized–accordingly, it is likely the referendum
will exacerbate, rather than mitigate, the political crisis in Egypt.
Perhaps, then, it is fortunate that the new constitution renders elections
largely superfluous, henceforth. All that is left is for Gen. al-Sisi to “run”
for president, and the Egyptian counterrevolution will be complete.
ENJOYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY!
And Blessed Are The Ones Who Care For Their
Fellow Men!
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