Saturday 22 March 2014

Egypt’s ‘Democratic’ Coup

Egypt’s ‘Democratic’ Coup

The Same Old ‘Remedy’ that Has Failed For Decades

by DEEPAK TRIPATHI

Recent events in Egypt mark a new phase in the country’s turbulent
politics. President Mohamed Morsi’s overthrow by the armed forces in
early July was decisive in the immediate run, ending a brief democratic
experiment with a Muslim Brotherhood politician in power. Beyond the
immediate outcome, the military takeover has thrown Egypt’s future
into uncertainty and caused further splits in society. While the
Brotherhood insists on Morsi’s reinstatement, an unlikely prospect, the
anti-Morsi coalition of liberals, secularists and Mubarak-era elites is
determined to move on. More than promises to hold elections, the
military’s future course of action is vague at best.

The coup would have been inconceivable without millions of anti-Morsi
Egyptians pouring out into the streets of Cairo and other cities. The
protests offered the generals a justification to intervene on “behalf of the
people.” To many, Morsi was his own worst enemy. In his short
presidential tenure since winning the election by a wafer-thin majority a
year ago, Morsi had alienated large sections of Egyptian society that had
either not voted for him, or had supported him reluctantly.
Egypt’s Christian minority, about 10 percent of the 85 million population,
felt threatened by the new constitution pushed through by President
Morsi, who was viewed as too Islamist and who had amassed too much
power in the presidency. Liberal and women’s groups were deeply
unhappy. The Morsi administration was unable to tackle the worsening
economy, betraying the hopes of many Egyptians. For them, the revolution that
toppled Hosni Mubarak was far from over. So, amid renewed demonstrations against Egypt’s
elected head of state, the military removed President Morsi on “behalf of the people.”

There are problems with this narrative, however. The truth is that the Egyptian people
are bitterly divided into the Morsi camp and the opposition, which in itself is fragmented. That
Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood still enjoy substantial support among the poorest sections,
especially in the countryside, is not in doubt. In the wake of the military coup, large
demonstrations in support of the deposed president cannot be disregarded. And then the military
crackdown against the Brotherhood leadership.

In one of the bloodiest incidents in Egypt’s recent history, more than 50
Morsi supporters were killed when soldiers shot at a crowd, said to be
praying outside the headquarters of the Republican Guards. Bloodshed
continues on a daily basis. Morsi and other senior figures of the
Brotherhood are either in custody or at large. He is under investigation
for “spying, inciting violence and ruining the economy.” The leaders’
assets have been frozen.

These events do not bode well for Egypt and the wider Middle East. The
military is back in power, and the most significant political movement,
with grassroots support, is the target of repression. Leading opponents of
the Muslim Brotherhood are collaborating with the military. This
draconian political experiment has failed decade after decade in Egypt,
and the record of military coups leading to a smooth transition to real
democracy is poor. The same educated liberal-secular middle classes
that were in opposition to Morsi’s rule will soon be opposing the military
regime. It is only a matter of time.

The two greatest risks for Egypt and the region are further radicalization
and volatility. There are credible reports that the military overthrow of
President Morsi happened under the Obama administration’s close
watch. On July 6, the New York Times published an account of the final
hours of Morsi’s presidency, written by David D. Kirkpatrick and Mayy
El Sheikh. According to their account, the United States, through an Arab
foreign minister acting as emissary, made a final offer which would avoid
a military coup: the appointment of a new prime minister and cabinet
that would take over all legislative powers and replace Morsi’s chosen
provincial governors.

For Morsi, it was a coup in all but name, and he refused. A telephone call
between President Morsi’s top adviser, Essam el-Haddad, and President
Obama’s national security adviser, Susan Rice, followed. Rice informed
him that a military takeover was to begin. The State Department had no
comment on America’s role.

Washington’s response in the aftermath, and the announcement that the
United States would go ahead with the supply of F16 aircraft to the
military, suggest that Washington’s priority is to see “controlled change”
in Egypt. In President Obama’s preferred scenario, any
change will be under the supervision of the army, with a lesser role at
best for the Muslim Brotherhood in governance in future. Washington’s
latest remedy, in its fundamentals, is no different from the past, since
President Anwar Sadat broke with the Soviet Union in the 1970s, and
subsequently joined the U.S. alliance.


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And Blessed Are The Ones Who Care For Their Fellow Men!

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